12 ideas
| 9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
| 10990 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read] |
| 14369 | Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens] |
| 14365 | Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens] |
| 14368 | We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens] |
| 9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
| 9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
| 9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
| 9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
| 9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
| 9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
| 10991 | Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read] |